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8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKH'\QDPLFVRI5HJLRQDO*URZWKDQG6KULQNDJHLQVW&HQWXU\-DSDQ
7RZDUGVWKH$FKLHYHPHQWRIDQ$VLD-3DFLILFµ'HSRSXODWLRQ'LYLGHQG¶ 
3HWHU0DWDQOH8QLYHUVLW\RI6KHIILHOG 
 
Introduction 
-DSDQLVVKULQNLQJ8QGHUSUHVHQWWUHQGVJRYHUQPHQWSURMHFWLRQVLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRSXODWLRQ 
may decrease in number by up to one third, from nearly 128 million people in 2008 to around 87 
million by 2060 (NIPSSR 2012)1, due to a sustained fall in rates of human reproduction in the postwar 
era. In combination with steadily increasing life expectancy Japan is therefore one of the most rapidly 
ageing countries in the world. With 25 per cent of the population now aged 65 or over, Japan is now a 
µK\SHU-DJHGVRFLHW\¶and the consequences of ageing and depopulation are already appearing across 
the entire Japanese archipelago and throughout all areas of activity (Coulmas 2007: 5; MIC 2015). 
Population reduction is potentially good news, providing opportunities for reconfiguring living 
conditions and alleviating human-environmental pressures. Nevertheless, ageing and depopulation 
have outcomes that require adjustment for affected regions and sectors. One of these is spatial 
inequalities, on a national scale between provincial and metropolitan regions, and regionally between 
rural and urban locales. This gap between rural and urban Japan has been present since at least the 
early 20th century, but has accelerated and become more acute since the 1990s, when the onset of 
economic stagnation coincided with the unwinding of the demographic tempo effects of the postwar 
baby boom and the long period of below replacement fertility. For example, the proportion of the 
population of working age has been declining since reaching its peak of 70% in 1990. By 2010 it had 
fallen to 64%, and will reach an anticipated 51% in 2060 (MIC 2015), presenting challenges for the 
government in achieving fiscal stability and maintaining adequate care of older people. This is a 
pressing concern for rural regions especially, whose economic development and capital accumulation 
have lagged urban areas, but where the proportion of older residents requiring interventions is larger. 
These and other issues exemplify a fissure developing between rural and urban regions, which looks 
set to deepen and widen in the future. 
What is significant DERXW-DSDQ¶VVLWXDWLRQLVKRZDGDSWLYHUHVSRQVHVWKHUHPLJKWLQIRUPDERXWIXWXUH
prospects for other Asia-Pacific countries as they experience similar post-growth trajectories. Just as 
-DSDQ¶Vth century developmental leadership in Asia has long been acknowledged (Akamatsu 1962; 
Chang 2006), in the 21st century Japan might be seen as the pioneer ageing and shrinking society for 
                                                          
11,3665SURMHFWLRQVSUHVHQWHGKHUHDUHPHGLXPYDULDQWDQGEDVHGRQFRQVWDQWUDWHVRIIHUWLOLW\813RSXODWLRQ
'LYLVLRQ SURMHFWLRQV DVVXPH D IHUWLOLW\ ERXQFH EDFN DQG WKHUHIRUH DQWLFLSDWH VORZHU SRSXODWLRQ VKULQNDJH IRU
-DSDQWKDQ1,3665GDWD 
trends that are becoming increasingly prevalent on an Asia-Pacific and even global scale (Jackson 
2014; Kaneko and Sato 2013; Matanle 2014; Matsutani 2006), with rural-urban imbalances and 
inequalities being key indicators of national stability. 
This chapter follows on from LüW]HOHU¶V numerical analysis of regional social inequality in Japan, and 
(OLV¶V RQ WKH GLVFRXUVH RI rural-urban dynamics (chapters 12 and 13 in this volume) to present an 
overview of rural-urban dynamics in post-growth Japan via a qualitative analysis of the means by 
which some rural residents are exercising their agency in responding to their emerging circumstances. 
Overall, the chapter is intended as a call to understand the broader geographical significance of 
-DSDQ¶Vcurrent situation E\VXJJHVWLQJWKDWDJHQF\ZLWKLQ-DSDQ¶VUXUDOUHJLRQVFDQGHOLYHUSRVLWLYH
spill-RYHUHIIHFWVZLWKWKHUXUDO-DSDQHVHH[SHULHQFHEHLQJSRWHQWLDOO\XVHIXOERWKLQDVVLVWLQJ-DSDQ¶V
urban areas in their transition to shrinkage, and in contributing to an emerging post-growth and post-
developmental relationship between Japan and its Asia-Pacific neighbours. Hence, the next section 
begins by setting Japan within the world demographic context. I will then describe some of the 
LPSDFWVRIDJHLQJDQGGHSRSXODWLRQ LQ-DSDQ¶V UXUDO UHJLRQV and use a case study of Sado Island in 
1LLJDWD3UHIHFWXUHWRLOOXVWUDWHUHVLGHQWV¶responses. In conclusion I will suggest that there is potential 
for benefitting from demographic shrinkage ± ZKDW , WHUPD µGHSRSXODWLRQGLYLGHQG¶ LQhomage to 
%ORRP&DQQLQJDQG6HYLOOD¶VµGHPRJUDSKLFGLYLGHQG¶2 ± and for Japan to lead its neighbours 
into a more sustainable post-growth steady-state economy (Daly 1996). I define the depopulation 
dividend as the achievement from depopulation of positive gains that contribute to socio-cultural, 
political-economic, and environmentally sustainable living. 
 
Japan in the World Demographic Context 
In the 21st century a historic turnaround in world demographic trends is under way (Lutz, Sanderson 
and Scherbov 2001; Rostow 1998). Demographic transition theory shows a convergence on below 
replacement fertility (Wilson 2011) whereby developed regions (17% of current world population) 
will undergo depopulation, and developing countries with intermediate fertility levels (70% of world 
population) will stabilise and may experience shrinkage on reaching developed status. The remaining 
13% from least developed countries will either continue with high fertility or develop into 
intermediate or lower fertility regions (UNPD 2015). 
In East Asia, 6RXWK.RUHDDQG&KLQDDUHDWWKHWDLOHQGRIH[SHULHQFLQJWKHLUµGHPRJUDSKLFGLYLGHQG¶
(see, Bloom et al. 2003), whereby rapid demographic change and economic expansion have gone 
                                                          
27KHµGHPRJUDSKLFGLYLGHQG¶UHIHUVWRDSHULRGLQDFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWZKHQFKLOGPRUWDOLW\GHFUHDVHV
FDXVLQJZRPHQWRKDYHIHZHUFKLOGUHQDQGOLIH-H[SHFWDQF\LQFUHDVHVSURGXFLQJDWHPSRUDULO\ODUJHUZRUNLQJ
DJHSRSXODWLRQ$FFRPSDQLHGE\VRXQGSXEOLFKHDOWKDQGHFRQRPLFSROLFLHVWKLVVHWRIFLUFXPVWDQFHVFDQDVVLVW
LQSURSHOOLQJDFRXQWU\LQWRDQDGYDQFHGVWDWHRIGHYHORSPHQW7KHWHUPZDVILUVWFRLQHGE\%ORRP&DQQLQJ
DQG6HYLOODLQWKHLUERRNRIWKHVDPHWLWOH 
hand in hand to deliver significant improvements in material well-being. Other countries in East and 
Southeast Asia are experiencing similar developmental pathways. Indeed, the successful economic 
development of Asia undoubtedly has been one of the seminal events in human history, DQG-DSDQ¶V
spearhead contribution in helping to galvanise RWKHUFRXQWULHV¶GHYHORSPHQWDOregimes should not be 
underestimated. However, East Asia is ageing too, and about to begin shrinking. Once more Japan is 
leading the way. VLHZHG QHJDWLYHO\ WKLV PLJKW EH FRQVLGHUHG D µGHPRJUDSKLF EXUGHQ¶ FUHDWLQJ a 
complex series of systemic crises across the area. Alongside the potential for long-term economic 
contraction and the need to reform unsustainable fiscal structures, these might include higher levels of 
socio-economic inequality between growing and shrinking regions, whereby the winners from 
responses to FKDQJLQJ SRSXODWLRQ VWUXFWXUHV GUDZ IXUWKHU DZD\ IURP WKH µORVHUV¶ ,Q WKHVH
circumstances it is also worth considering how these phenomena affect collective notions of social, 
cultural and political solidarity within nations that, even today, consider themselves to be relatively 
homogeneous and cohesive. Issues of rural-urban inequality are, therefore, deeply interwoven with 
socio-economic development DQG PRUHRYHU UHVRQDWH ZLWK SHRSOH¶V RYHUDOO VHQVH RI identity and 
connectedness. 
 
Figure 1. Actual & Projected Population 
Change in East Asia 1950-2100 (millions. 
Japan and South Korea left hand scale, China 
right hand scale) 
Fig. 2. Actual and projected child and old age 
dependency ratio in East Asia (per cent) 
<FIGURE 1> <FIGURE 2> 
Source: UNPD (2015). Note: Medium variant 
projections and variable fertility. 
Source: UNPD (2015). 
 
Figure 1 uses UN Population Division data3 to display actual and projected demographic change in 
Japan, China and South Korea. Japan grew by 82% in the 75 year period up to its population peak in 
2010, and is projected to shrink 26% by 2085. The graph forecasts similar paths for South Korea and 
China. South Korea is projected to grow and shrink 110% and 27% in the 75 and 65 year periods 
either side of its expected peak in 2035, and China by 100% and 29% in the 75 and 70 year periods 
either side of its peak in around 2030. 
In all three countries, projections for the dependency ratio between working and non-working people 
(see Figure 2) point to challenging consequences for long-term fiscal stability, for the continuation of 
                                                          
3813'GDWDLVXVHGWRSURYLGHFOHDUHULQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSDULVRQ81SURMHFWLRQVIRU-DSDQDUHPRUH
FRQVHUYDWLYHWKDQWKH-DSDQHVHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDVVXPLQJDIHUWLOLW\ERXQFH-EDFN 
growth-oriented economic regimes, and for maintaining community stability and resilience in affected 
regions. Figures 1 and 2 also show that 1990 is a significant turning point for Japan, as it marks the 
HQG RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V GHPRJUDSKLF GLYLGHQG ZKHQ WKH SURSRUWLRQ RI ZRUNLQJ DJH SHRSOH LQ WKe 
population reached its peak and, coincidentally, it was also the year that the economy tilted into its 
long stagnation. Thereafter the proportion of the population dependent on working people has risen 
steadily and is expected to reach about one worker per dependent in 2055. China and South Korea are 
both expected to reach their most advantageous ratios in 2015-20, whereupon both will follow Japan 
and experience greater pressures in maintaining the ratio of contributions from working people to 
overall socio-economic well-being. 
Together with changes iQWKHDJHVWUXFWXUHRI-DSDQ¶V population has occurred a dramatic shift in its 
spatial distribution, due to the familiar processes of agricultural transformation, industrialization, and 
urbanization that accompany modern economic development (England 2005; Egglestone and 
Tuljapurkar 2011). Whereas in 1960 41% RI-DSDQ¶VSRSXODWLRQOLYHGLQXUEDQUHJLRQVE\Whis 
had increased to 67%. Simultaneously the total population expanded by 73% over the same period. 
While slower economic growth since the 1990s has reduced the rate of urbanisation from rural-urban 
migration, the unwinding of demographic tempo effects produced by very long-term low fertility has 
meant, first, that urban populations have followed rural regions into an era of rapid population ageing 
and, second, the rate of population loss in rural areas has continued, even accelerated in many areas 
since the 1990s, as an increasing proportion of the rural population passes away. The result has been 
both a flattening of urbanisation rates as the growth in the national population slowed, as well as a 
deepening spiral of community ageing and depopulation in rural regions (Matanle and Sato 2010). 
Consequently, while urban areas experienced enormous pressures in accommodating demand for 
housing, infrastructure, goods and services in the early post-war decades, ageing has now become a 
more pressing concern, and urban questions continue to be the focus of human geographers interested 
in contemporary Japanese spatial patterns. Less remarked in the academic and mainstream discourses, 
perhaps because it is less noticeable, has been the stresses that population ageing and loss have placed 
on rural regions. 
Similar demographic patterns are evident in China, South Korea, as well as other Asia-Pacific 
countries such as New Zealand (Jackson 2014), producing some dramatic outcomes. First has been 
the appearance of extreme differences in rural-urban population size and density. Huge urban 
metropolises have emerged, supplied with sophisticated high cost infrastructure to enable complex 
economies and diverse societies to function. These cities consequently generate an enormous 
gravitational pull, drawing in people and resources from their suburban, periurban, and rural 
surroundings, which accumulates into a widening gap between dynamic and prosperous metropolitan 
centres and a declining and disconnected periphery. In Japan the Kanto region FDQµERDVW¶WKDWLWLVWKH
ZRUOG¶V ODUJHVWXUEDQDUHDE\SRSXODWLRQ4 China possesses at least six megacities of more than ten 
PLOOLRQSHUVRQVDQGVHYHQRIWKHZRUOG¶Vten largest urban areas are located along the western arc of 
the Pacific Ocean ± in order of magnitude: Tokyo, Jakarta, Manila, Seoul, Shanghai, Beijing, and 
Guangzhou (Demographia, 2015: 20). And DWPLOOLRQSHRSOH$XFNODQGKDVRI1HZ=HDODQG¶V
population within its environs.  
Second, until the 1990s, urbanization in Japan was taking place against the backdrop of an expanding 
national population and economy. Metropolitan centres and prefectural capitals in particular grew 
rapidly, to some extent at the expense of rural shrinkage, but mainly because the whole country was 
growing. However, in the 1990s and 2000s population growth ground to a halt. With the onset of 
national-scale depopulation in 2008 nearly all settlements are now shrinking, including most 
provincial core cities. This has produced a gradual awakening in Japan since the 1990s that 
depopulation can no longer be dismissed as simply an unfortunate rural expression of successful 
national economic development, as it all too often used to be, but as a significant problem confronting 
nearly all except the very largest settlements (AS 06.01.2014; Matanle and Rausch et al. 2011). Other 
Asia-Pacific countries are themselves also approaching the time when they have to face the 
consequences of national-scale depopulation. 
 
Ageing and Depopulation in Rural Japan: Employment and Overcapacity 
In circumstances of national-scale depopulation it is axiomatic that population growth in one 
settlement is balanced by proportionately greater shrinkage in another. Hence, as Tokyo continues to 
grow, drawing in people and resources from elsewhere, nearly every other settlement in Japan is now 
shrinking. In these circumstances, the FDSLWDO UHJLRQ¶V strong unipolar concentration has even 
produced demographic destabilising effects in the Keihanshin urban region of Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe 
(Buhnik 2014). And in peripheral rural areas some communities are collapsing and others have been 
abandoned by their residents, leaving ghost towns and villages behind (see, Grist, 2014). This is what 
-DSDQHVHVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVPHDQZKHQ WKH\GHVFULEHµgenkai shǌUDNX¶, RUµFRPPXQLWLHVRQ WKHHGJH¶
(Ono 2005), where more than 50% of residents are over 65 and the community is unable to reproduce 
itself. In these places there is little economic activity, few children are being born, much of the built 
environment lies empty and deteriorating, and agricultural land is left for scrub. Forests encroach on 
residences, leaving villagers with less light and giving cover for pests such as monkeys, bears, deer, 
and boar to approach and raid allotments and orchards, ransack houses, and confront elderly residents 
(Knight 2003). According to the Rural Development Planning Commission, in 2005 there were 1,403 
communities in imminent danger of collapse in Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu (NKKI 2006: 33), 
                                                          
4(VWLPDWHVIRUWKHSRSXODWLRQRIWKH.DQWRUHJLRQUDQJHDURXQG-PLOOLRQSHRSOHRUDSSUR[LPDWHO\RI
WKHSRSXODWLRQRI-DSDQ 
ZKLOH LQ  WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI ,QWHUQDO $IIDLUV GHVFULEHG  RI -DSDQ¶V  VHWWOHments as 
having a population with an average age of 65 and over, with the proportion being identified as such 
doubling from 7.5 to 15.5% of settlements between 2001 and 2011; 205 of which had 100% of their 
population over the age of 75 (MIC 2011: 7-8). 
What are some of the conditions of living and working LQ-DSDQ¶VUXUDOUHJLRQVDQGZKDWKDYHEHHQ
some of the responses to community decline, in particular since the post-growth era began in the 
1990s? Below I present description and analysis distilled from 25 years of personal experience of and 
research into rural depopulation and decline in Japan, focusing on issues of employment and over-
capacity in Niigata Prefecture and Sado Island (see, Matanle 2006; Matanle and Sato 2010). 
Beginning with stable employment, which is the basic foundation for a durable and resilient 
community, well-paid secure full-time jobs are in short supply in rural Japan. Traditional routes into 
employment for eldest sons and daughters wishing to remain in the family holding and care for ageing 
parents, such as family enterprises, municipal administration, school teaching, and construction are 
disappearing where economic functions are in decline, services in reorganization and retreat, and 
government redistribution measures being cut back. For example, over-capacity in educational 
infrastructure due to a drop of approximately 50% nationwide in the number of school age children 
means that prefectural and municipal authorities are merging and closing schools, leading to fewer 
teaching opportunities; with increasing numbers of empty school buildings dotting the landscape, 
UHPLQGLQJUHVLGHQWVRIRQFHWKULYLQJFRPPXQLWLHVQRLV\ZLWKFKLOGUHQ¶VSOD\see Figure 3). 
Where a low-fertility culture means that most couples have one or perhaps two children, the lack of 
rural employment can have long-term impacts on community reproduction and sustainability. 
Ordinarily, in multi-children households in the past the eldest son, or another of the children, would 
remain near to the family holding and take stable employment in public services or teaching, for 
example, to look after the family business, farm or property as his (or her) parents aged and this 
would allow younger siblings to migrate to urban locales safe in the knowledge of household and 
community continuity. As economic opportunities have contracted, particularly since the 1990s, and 
single-children households have become the norm, younger people who have felt the need to move 
away to seek educational, employment and social opportunities in provincial cities or metropolitan 
regions, leave their parents alone and deprive the community of its reproductive potential. Few return. 
 
Figure 3. Two abandoned schools in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture; an elementary school in Sotokaifu 
(top left), and a junior high school in Hatano (top right) presently being used as storage for 
construction materials; and two abandoned hotels, in Aikawa, Sado City, Niigata Prefecture (left), and 
7ǀ\ǀ7RZQ.RFKL3UHIHFWXUHULJKW3KRWRV3HWHU0DWDnle). 
<FIGURE 3> 
 In these cases family businesses are inevitably abandoned and disappear, and leave residents ± 
predominantly older people - dependent on a depleted community base. These households are often 
small-scale crafts manufacturers, niche food and beverage producers, small-scale local retailers, 
restaurants, guest houses and small hotels (see Figure 3), and their closure causes secondary damage 
to economic potential, just as PXQLFLSDODXWKRULWLHVDUHVHHNLQJWRERRVWWKHORFDOH¶VDWWUactiveness to 
outsiders to strengthen economic sustainability. Following is a statement by a teacher with 
responsibility for career education at a senior high school (ages 15-17), describing the employment 
situation there DQG\RXQJHUSHRSOH¶VDSWLWXGHV 
 
When they graduate most [students] leave and the number that return is small. Even if graduates 
want to return [to Sado], there are few places that can employ them because their skills and 
knowledge are not suited to the work here .... There are no big companies and manufacturing has 
almost disappeared, construction is scaling down, agriculture is more difficult ... managers tend to 
be from outside, while temps and part-timers are usually locals.  
Senior High School teacher and careers advisor, Niibo, Sado City, Niigata Prefecture.5 
 
Similarly, as a result of central government measures aimed ostensibly at providing local autonomy 
through decentralization and rationalization, and partly with the intention of providing the tools to 
respond specifically to ageing and depopulation in rural regions, a wave of municipal mergers took 
place through the early 2000s which saw the number of municipalities decrease by 45%, from 3,229 
to 1,788 between 1999 and 2008 (Rausch 2012: 187; Yokomichi 2007: 6-7). Niigata Prefecture saw 
the greatest proportion of mergers in Japan, with the number of municipalities dropping 69%, from 
112 to 35 (Yokomichi 2007: 20). In 2004 Sado Island, which had lost nearly 50% of its 1950 
population, went from ten municipalities to a single Sado City. 
In Sado, as well as many other rural places in Japan, the merger has driven a reorganization and 
centralization of essential services, resulting in the closure of public facilities and buildings in 
peripheral areas. Consequently, aV RI 'HFHPEHU  -DSDQ¶V ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV KDG SODQV WR
demolish 12,251 redundant municipal buildings nationwide at a projected cost of JPY404 billion, with 
none being scheduled for renovation or rebuilding, and only 40% of which are currently in use (NKS 
03.12.2013). Moreover, as services have become more distant from users, and public transport cut 
back, residents feel forced into cars, which disproportionately affects older people, who often have 
                                                          
5,QWHUYLHZVFRQGXFWHGE\3HWHU0DWDQOHLQDQG 
mobility restrictions, but who may not drive. Hence, younger and middle-aged people then spend 
resources and time helping and caring for elderly relatives and neighbours in compensation for 
reduced formal service provision. Although such kindness is admirable, it reduces the opportunity that 
able citizens have for economic sustenance activity. Furthermore, as organizations close facilities, 
remove duplication, and slim workforces through retiree attrition, businesses located nearby such as 
restaurants and cafes lose customers, as indicated by the following quotation: 
 
The municipal merger has meant that there are fewer public officials working here, as jobs have 
been closed down or moved to the new city office. So, the bulk of our lunchtime business has now 
gone ... My husband's bar also gets fewer customers in the evening as public officials do their 
evening eating and drinking in the new restaurants in Sawata, which is closer to the city office.  
Café and restaurant owner, Aikawa, Sado City, Niigata Prefecture. 
 
Finally, the growing preference among urban Japanese for travel and tourism overseas means that 
tourism related work is declining in many domestic rural destinations, particularly for women seeking 
part-time or seasonal employment to supplement family incomes and enable informal care roles. 
Although international tourism to Japan is increasing, foreign visitors rarely venture beyond the most 
popular sites in Tokyo and Kyoto. Sadly, in response to the decline in their populations and 
economies through the post-war period, many regional municipalities had attempted to revitalize their 
declining economies through the development of tourism facilities, which have since failed, leaving 
towns saddled with huge debts and a declining tax base. YǌEDUL &LW\ LQ +RNNDLGo is a well-
documented example, where the collapse of the coal-mining industry led to a severe decline in the 
FLW\¶VIRUWXQHVDQGDQDWWHPSW WRUHYHUVH WKLV WKURXJKDPLVJXLGHGDQGXOWLPDWHO\FDWDVWURSKLFRYHU-
investment in tourism development (Culter 1999: Seaton 2010). 
 
Figure 4: Abandoned and empty buildings are now a common sight in provincial regions. Clockwise 
IURPWRSOHIW$IDUPKRXVHLQ5\ǀWVX6DGR&LW\1LLJDWD3UHIHFWXUHDIDUPKRXVHZLWKDWUHHJURZLQJ
RXWZDUGVIURPWKHLQVLGHLQ7ǀ\ǀ7RZQ.RFhi Prefecture; an office building and shops in Ueda City, 
Nagano Prefecture; rows of abandoned houses in Horonai, Mikasa, Hokkaido; a restaurant and shop 
in Aikawa, Sado City; and a row of empty shops in Shibata City, Niigata Prefecture. 
<FIGURE 4> 
 
 
Alongside securing stable employment, dealing with overcapacity has become a serious concern in 
non-metropolitan regions, as communities shrink, leaving excess housing stock, an underused built 
environment, and underworked land. Provincial real estate markets are failing as houses remain empty 
and occupancy rates in apartment blocks reach alarmingly low levels. Property reinvestment is falling 
and the built environment looking shabby and derelict, further depressing the atmosphere, reducing 
land values and encouraging out-migration by those who can ± leaving behind those who FDQ¶W. The 
prefectures with the most rapid depopulation also, not unexpectedly, have the lowest land prices; 
Tokyo (JPY309,700/m2) is more than 20 times as expensive as Akita (JPY15,300/m2) (MLIT 2014). 
Empty houses, or akiya, are becoming unsellable due to colonization by fauna and flora, and 
thousands of shops and businesses lie empty and deteriorating or are underused (see Figure 4). Data 
from the JRYHUQPHQW¶V2008 Housing and Land Survey show 7.6 million vacant dwellings in Japan, 
up from 3.9 million in 1988, 2.7 million of which (1.3 million in 1988) were categorized as being left 
unattended or whose owners had died (MIC 2008). 
It is difficult to imagine that one could derive benefits and opportunities from such circumstances. In 
the next section, however, I will show that some people are attempting to do so, as a result of a 
gradually emerging change in personal orientation away from 20th century values that prioritize 
economic growth and demographic expansion, towards 21st century values that emphasize the 
DFKLHYHPHQWRISHUVRQDODQGFRPPXQLW\ZHOOEHLQJ+HUH¶VKRZ 
 
Community Responses Under National-Scale Depopulation: (Re)Valuing Localism, 
Environment, and Lifestyle Aesthetics 
OXWVLGH -DSDQ¶V PHWURSROLWDQ FHQWUHV WKH SURVSHFW RI FRPPXQLW\ JURZWK LV QRZ LPSRVVLEOH IRU WKH
majority of settlements. Indeed, ageing and shrinkage are already occurring in more than nine out of 
WHQRI-DSDQ¶VPXQLFLSDOLWLHV LQFOXGLQJPDQ\XUEDQDQGVXEXrban locales (AS 06.01.2014). How are 
rural residents adjusting to the new dynamic of national-scale depopulation? In particular, can the 
HPHUJHQFHRIDµGHSRSXODWLRQGLYLGHQG¶EHREVHUYHGRQHWKDWPLJKWSURYLGHVRPHOHVVRQVIRURWKHU
Asia-Pacific countries encountering similar dynamics? In this section I focus on community and 
individual responses to rural depopulation and link these to changes in value orientations; for it is 
universally agreed that values inform human motivation, which in turn feeds behaviour, and which 
together constitute part of a complex series of psychological and emotional dimensions that constitute 
µDJHQF\¶'DKOJDDUGDQG'DKOJDDUG*LGGHQV 
Throughout the postwar era government interventions into the rural-urban divide in Japan have been 
dominated by a complex system of financial transfers to boost investment in rural infrastructure. To a 
great extent these measures have failed, principally because they were as much rooted in nefarious 
political and financial relationships ± WKHµLURQ-WULDQJOH¶RIWKHEXUHDXFUDF\EXVLQHVVDQGSROLWLFVDQG
WKHµFRQVWUXFWLRQVWDWH¶)HOGKRII0F&RUPDFN± as they were intended to resolve regional 
imbalances. Indeed, these so-FDOOHG µVSDWLDO HTXDOL]DWLRQ PHDVXUHV¶ PD\ KDYH made the situation 
worse, for example by incentivizing villages to exhibit the characteristics of a collapsing community 
LQRUGHUWRFRQWLQXHWRUHFHLYHVWDWHµkaso¶depopulation) subsidies (Mizohata 2010). 
Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that JDSDQ¶VFHQWUDOO\PDQDJHGSRVWZDUGHYHORSPHQWKDV
ZUHDNHG KDYRF RQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V QDWXUDO HQYLURQPHQW .HUU  0DWDQOH DQG5DXVFK HW DO. 2011; 
McCormack 2001). The felling of original growth mixed-leaf forests and replacement by cedar 
monoculture, the conFUHWLQJRIYLUWXDOO\DOORI-DSDQ¶VPDMRUULYHUVIRUIORRGFRQWUROWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQ
RIFRPPHUFLDODLUSRUWVGDPVDQGPLOOLRQNPRIURDGVDQGWKHSUHVHQFHRIµEULGJHVWR
QRZKHUH¶ µWXQQHOV ZLWKRXW H[LWV¶ DQG µSRUWV ZLWKRXW VKLSV¶ PXVW EH Iamiliar to anyone with a 
NQRZOHGJH RI -DSDQ¶V th century regional development (ICOLD 2014; Kerr 2002; McCormack 
2001; MIC 2015; World Airport Database 2015). Yet, despite these decades of lavish spending, 
-DSDQ¶VUHJLRQDOFRPPXQLWLHVFRQWLQXHUHVROXWHO\to shrink and deteriorate.  
Where official policies continue to promote the notion of revitalization as a synonym for growth,6 
some residents of rural areas express frustration because they recognise that in circumstances of 
national-scale shrinkage these are unattainable goals for their communities. The response among some 
residents is to conflate socio-economic, cultural, and environmental decline, to ascribe these to 
-DSDQ¶VWRS-down and urban-centred modernization, and to work towards the establishment of a more 
balanced relationship with their surroundings. Consequently, some are beginning to include or even 
prioritize other values in their decision-making; their rationale being that, where growth is 
unattainable, and in order to maintain a positive and hopeful outlook, it makes sense to place greater 
importance on values that can be realized. Of these, three orientations have been expressed, and these 
represent a turn towards the local or regional, environmental conservation, and lifestyle aesthetics.  
Hence, a new localism has been HPHUJLQJ LQ -DSDQ¶V SURYLQFLDO UHJLRQV since the 1990s. This is 
expressed via endogenous small-scale activities for the purposes of rejuvenating community 
sustainability through, for example, cultural and social development, creating a comfortable and 
functional built environment, promotion of health and well-being, care and compassion for more 
vulnerable citizens, micro-energy generation, clean agriculture, bio-diversity conservation, and the 
development of a regional and local politics. Recently this movement was given powerful extra 
LPSHWXVDIWHUWKH0DUFKWVXQDPLDQGQXFOHDUFULVLVLQ7ǀKRNX)XNXVKLPDEHFDXVHWKHcentral 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHJLRQDO SROLFLHV ZHUH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK FRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKH VHYHULW\ RI WKH XQIROGLng 
disasters (Feldhoff 2013; Matanle 2011). These movements are specific to local contexts and are 
usually neither anti-Tokyo nor anti-growth, though a deep scepticism is present among some as to 
                                                          
6µ*URZWK¶LVRIWHQXVHGDPELJXRXVO\ZLWKRXWDFOHDUVHSDUDWLRQEHWZHHQLWVFRQVWLWXHQWHOHPHQWVDQGZKHUH
GHPRJUDSKLFDQGHFRQRPLFH[SDQVLRQLQWKHPRGHUQHUDKDYHEHFRPHFRQIODWHGWRPHDQRQHDQGWKHVDPH
WKLQJ 
whether the political, bureaucratic and business elites in Tokyo understand, and are therefore able to 
respond to, local concerns. Consequently, for example, on 5 June 2013 50 municipalities representing 
4.3 million people signHGXS WR WKHQHZO\HVWDEOLVKHG µ$VVRFLDWLRQRI0XQLFLSDOLWLHVIRU ,PSURYLQJ
Residents' Sense of Well-%HLQJ¶QLFNQDPHGWKHµ+DSSLQHVV/HDJXH¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIGHYHORSLQJ
small scale local projects that promote personal well-being, sharing information between 
municipalities, and by-passing the central government in Tokyo (ISHES 2013). 
Together with those who are raising social, political, and environmental concerns, there are an 
increasing number of people in Japan who are preferring lifestyle aesthetics. This can be seen most 
readily in the increasing number of lovingly restored houses and other buildings using locally sourced 
materials, and craftspeople using traditional methods. In some cases initiators have been long-term 
foreign residents who are disappointed with the aesthetics in post-war planning and architecture, or 
are seeking to contribute to community sustainability, and have begun with restoration of their own 
properties, which then galvanises others nearby to do the same. Many properties serve as businesses 
and have become focal points for local cultural and socio-economic revitalization efforts. While these 
businesses can be profitable, the owners¶ IRFXV has been primarily personal, social, and cultural, 
rather than economic (for example, Kerr 2013). 
In Sado Island in Niigata Prefecture, where much of my own research has taken place, examples of 
the above change in value orientations, and their manifestation in behaviour are numerous. They are 
to a great extent responses to what residents view are the geographical, or regional, gaps (chiiki 
kakusa) that have been widening, particularly since the 1990s when Japan went into its long-term 
economic slowdown and the 2000s, when the central government adopted a more stringent approach 
to supporting rural areas, such as with the Trinity Reforms enacted by Prime Minister Koizumi (see, 
chapter 11 in this volume by Elis). What is interesting about these developments is how they are 
concerned with community restoration and cohesion, and not growth per se; though they are not anti-
growth. They are anchored in local particularities and show concern for the past as well as the present 
and future. They acknowledge that growth is no longer possible and instead represent a turn towards 
local community well-being. They are as much a consequence of the impacts of depopulation as they 
are about taking the opportunities that depopulation presents. It is important also to acknowledge that 
they are also derived from wider concerns, such as for climate change and biodiversity, and enable the 
people of Sado to reach out beyond traditional networks and structures to appeal to a global audience. 
1. Under Mayor Takano (2004-2012), Sado City launched a series of town hall hearing sessions to 
OHDUQRIORFDOSHRSOH¶VFRQFHUQVPRUH directly, and to engage in direct dialogue with citizens. The 
UHVXOWV KDYH WUDQVODWHG LQWR WKH PD\RU¶V JRDO RI PDNLQJ 6DGR LQWR D µsumiyasui tokoro¶ RU
comfortable living space, for local people. 
2. Part of the development of a sumiyasui tokoro has been a cDPSDLJQWRHVWDEOLVK6DGRDVDQµHFR-
LVODQG¶ DQG DQ H[DPSOH IRU people elsewhere to live in greater harmony with their natural 
surroundings. This includes various initiatives, such as eco-tourism to the original growth 
temperate rain forest in northeastern Sado, and has centred around the conservation of the 
symbolic toki, or Japanese crested ibis (Nipponia nippon ZKLFK LV -DSDQ¶V QDWLRQDO ELUG DQG
ZKRVHRQO\UHPDLQLQJKDELWDWLQ-DSDQLV6DGR)RUVRPHWKHVXUYLYDORIWKHLVODQG¶VVRFLHW\DQG
culture is associated with the continued residence of crested ibis such that, rather like the ravens 
at the Tower of London, the disappearance of the toki from Sado would presage the end of Sado 
as a human community. 
3. The desire to nurture the toki and return it to sustainability in its habitat, after a long period of the 
systematic promotion of conventional modern industrial agricultural techniques, is contributing 
to a revival of traditional food production and consumption practices in Sado (FAO 2010). This 
is manifested in, for example, the conservation of the satoyama landscape and agricultural 
system, which is unique to Japan, but which has valuable lessons for Asia in preserving bio-
diversity at the human-forest interface under wet rice agriculture. This led to the award to Sado in 
2011, in conjunction with the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture, of Globally Important 
Agricultural Heritage Status (GIAHS) by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN 
(FAO 2011). The award was especially notable because it was the first time any region in a 
developed country had been recognized for the importance of its agricultural heritage and the 
efforts of local people in conserving the natural environment for sustainable food production. 
Interestingly, the project joined multiple actors unused to working together in a coordinated 
effort going beyond traditional bureaucratic channels, including local, national and international 
organizations, academic and non-governmental institutions, and corporations (FAO 2010). 
4. Sado City government is also participating with a regional private education provider to develop 
vocational education relevant to local needs and sensibilities. NSG is the first post-secondary 
institution to be located in Sado, which delivers courses in Environmental Management, Care and 
:HOIDUHIRUWKH(OGHUO\DQG7UDGLWLRQDO&UDIWVLQFOXGLQJDUFKLWHFWXUDOUHVWRUDWLRQDQGµ0XP\RL¶
pottery, which is unique to Sado).7 Students come from Sado as well as other parts of Japan to 
study in one of JDSDQ¶VULFKHVWQDWXUDODQGFXOWXUDOHQYLURQPHQWV2SHQHGLQ$SULORQWKH
site of a former girls senior high school, and with a JPY200 million loan from the municipality, 
NSG now teaches six courses in related subjects and accepts up to 200 students per year group. 
For graduating students there are opportunities to remain in Sado working to care for the elderly 
population, as well as work in the restoration of temples and shrines, and in redeveloping the 
LVODQG¶V DUWV DQG FUDIWV KHULWDJH ,Q Dn era when more than 75% of each youth cohort now 
experiences post-secondary education this is a significant step for socio-cultural sustainability in 
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Sado because, for the first time, younger people do not have to leave the island if they wish to 
continue their studies beyond upper secondary school. 
5. Further examples of the municipal government and citizens of Sado reaching out beyond 
traditional networks to develop local social, environmental, and cultural resources, as well as 
contribute to those elsewhere, are (see Figure 5): 
a. The Small Island Study Association held its Fifth International Conference on Small Island 
&XOWXUHVLQ6DGRLQ6DGRPXQLFLSDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQLQLQYLWLQJWKHFRQIHUHQFH
WR WKH LVODQG ZDV WR EROVWHU HIIRUWV WR UHGHYHORS WKH LVODQG¶s cultural and environmental 
resourcesDVZHOODVWRVKDUH6DGR¶VH[SHULHQFHVDQGNQRZOHGJHZLWKSHRSOHOLYLQJLQVPDOO
islands across the world.8 
b. Sado is the base for the world famous Kodo taiko drumming group, who tour internationally 
and host a summer percussion festival in Ogi Town, which draws thousands of visitors to 
Sado. 9  Year-round the group contributes to music education and performance in Sado 
through its purpose-built centre in Ogi, southwestern Sado. 
c. Sado hosts an international triathlon in September each year. Celebrating its 16th year in 
2015, it attracts more than 1,200 athletes and sponsors from Japan and internationally.10 It is 
one of only two long-distance triathlons in Japan, comparable in distance and difficulty to 
the Iron Man event in Hawaii. From 2016 it will be the representative event for Japan in the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO7ULDWKORQ8QLRQ¶Vglobal schedule for elite athletes. As the centrepiece event of 
the municipal Sado City Sports Association, it is part of an island-wide effort to promote 
health and well-being among citizens, to attract visitors and contribute positively to the 
LVODQG¶VLPDJH11 
d. With the largest concentration of micro-EUHZHULHVRIDQ\SUHIHFWXUH1LLJDWD¶VUXUDODUHDVDUH 
famous internationally for sake production. Due to declining domestic markets for 
traditional sakeWZRRI6DGR¶VUHPDLQLQJVL[SURGXFHUVDUHUHVSRQGLQJWRULVLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDO
demand, with one winning prizes in international competitions, such as the International 
Wine Challenge in London and the US National Sake Appraisal, as well as supplying the 
First Class cabin of Air France, and anRWKHU VXSSO\LQJ WKH ZRUOGZLGH µ1REX¶ FKDLQ RI
restaurants part-owned by Hollywood film star Robert de Niro. 12  A third brewer is 
producing organic sake by purchasing rice directly from employees, by-passing 
conventional distribution systems, thereby providing a second income for them and 
strengthening local economic and environmental resilience simultaneously.13 
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96HHWKH.RGRZHEVLWHDW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LVODQG-IHVWDFRP 
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KWWSZZZREDWD-VKX]RFRP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 VDNp
e. Due to its history as a haven for political, religious, and intellectual exiles, Sado has the 
highest concentration of traditional Noh theatres outside of Kyoto. Approximately one third 
RI DOO -DSDQ¶V 1RK VWDJHV DUH ORFDWHG WKHUH PDQ\ DV SDUWV RI YLOODJH 6KULQH EXLOGLQJV
Restoration of shrines as Noh sites is ongoing and developing a following among 
DILFLRQDGRVRI1RKWKHDWUHLQ-DSDQDQGLQWHQGHGDVDSDUWRIWKHLVODQG¶VJUDGual restoration 
of its place as DFHQWUHIRU-DSDQ¶VDUWVDQGFUDIWVKHULWDJH 
 
Figure 5. Clockwise from top left: A hand-painted sign on a roadside in Sado. The caption reads 
µTowards the Toki flying once more¶WKHVDWR\DPDDJULFXOWXUDOODQGVFDSHLQAikawa, western Sado; 
7KH.RGRWDLNRGUXPJURXS¶VEDVHLQ2JL7RZQVRXWKZHVWHUQ6DGR6DNé produced exclusively by 
Hokusetsu of Hamochi in Sado for the Nobu international restaurant chain; original growth temperate 
rain forest in northeastern Sado; and Sado City gymnasium and base for the Sado City Sports 
Promotion Association. (All photos © Peter Matanle.) 
<FIGURE 5> 
 
Conclusion and Implications: Towards an Asia-3DFLILFµ'HSRSXODWLRQ'LYLGHQG¶ 
Since the 1990s Japan has been facing the prospect of an end to its modern expansion and the 
emergence of a post-growth society and economy. While the future is always uncertain, China and 
South Korea will also face some of the outcomes of ageing and depopulation currently being 
experienced by Japan, due to their similar patterns of demographic and economic change. Later in the 
century other Asia-Pacific countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and New Zealand may follow. 
The Asia-Pacific area will remain economically dynamic. However, a deep cleavage is appearing 
there, between large, vibrant, energetic and relatively young metropolitan centres, such as Tokyo, 
Shanghai, Seoul, and Jakarta, and Auckland, and an ageing, shrinking, depressed and struggling 
regional periphery. How this tension between urban dynamism and rural decay will unfold is 
contestable. Nevertheless, the potential for disruption is present and, I suggest, increasing. Not only is 
the number and size of marginal regional communities rising, their exposure to risks is expanding. 
Whereas in previous decades in Japan only the most peripheral hamlets were under threat, in the 21st 
century even provincial core cities are shrinking and losing their vitality. For example, the 11 March 
2011 tsunami in northeastern Japan revealed just how vulnerable marginal communities can be to 
external shocks. Climate change theory predicts extreme weather events of increasing frequency and 
intensity, and the Western zone of the Pacific Ring of Fire appears to be experiencing an increase in 
seismic activity (Lay, 2015), with large earthquakes occurring near Sumatra in 2004, New Zealand in 
2010, and Japan in 2011. As countries develop their economies there is an increasing risk of extreme 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
EUHZHU\ZHEVLWHV 
disturbances destabilising industrial facilities such as power stations and chemical plants. Hence, 
large-scale techno-HQYLURQPHQWDO VKRFNV VXFK DV RFFXUUHG LQ 7ǀKRNX DQG WKH )XNXVKLPD 'DLLFKL
nuclear power plant may in future strike ageing and shrinking regions elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. 
Careful study of how economic and demographic change interact in present-day Japan will provide 
essential knowledge for responding to similar circumstances in the rest of Asia and beyond in the 
decades to come. In particular, how Japan responds to the intersection between the long-run 
HQGRJHQRXV µGLVDVWHU¶ RI UXUDO GHFOLQH DQG WKH VXGGHQ H[RJHQRXV µGLVDVWHU¶ RI WKH  0DUFK 
tsunami and nuclear crisis will be especially instructive for other regions in Asia as they traverse their 
own paths through ageing, shrinkage, and post-LQGXVWULDO GHYHORSPHQW DQG VHHN D µGHSRSXODWLRQ
GLYLGHQG¶ 
Illustrations 
Figure 1. Actual & Projected Population Change 
in East Asia 1950-2100 (millions. Japan and 
South Korea left hand scale, China right hand 
scale) 
Fig. 2. Actual and projected child and old age 
dependency ratio in East Asia (per cent), 1950-
2100. 
 
 
Note: Medium variant projections and variable 
fertility. 
Source: UNPD (2015). 
Source: UNPD (2015). 
Note: The data for China do not include Hong Kong and Macao, Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of 
China, and Taiwan Province of China. 
  
Figure 3: Two abandoned schools in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture; an elementary school in Sotokaifu 
(top left), and a junior high school in Hatano (top right) presently being used as storage for 
construction materials; and two abandoned hotels, in Aikawa, Sado City, Niigata Prefecture (left), and 
7ǀ\ǀ7RZQ.RFKL3UHIHFWXUHULJKW3KRWRV3HWHU0DWDnle). 
 
  
Figure 4: Abandoned and empty buildings are now a common sight in provincial regions. Clockwise 
IURPWRSOHIW$IDUPKRXVHLQ5\ǀWVX6DGR&LW\1LLJDWD3UHIHFWXUHDIDUPKRXVHZLWKDWUHHJURZLQJ
RXWZDUGVIURPWKHLQVLGHLQ7ǀ\ǀ Town, Kochi Prefecture; an office building and shops in Ueda City, 
Nagano Prefecture; rows of abandoned houses in Horonai, Mikasa, Hokkaido; a restaurant and shop 
in Aikawa, Sado City; and a row of empty shops in Shibata City, Niigata Prefecture. 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Clockwise from top left: A hand-painted sign on a roadside in Sado. The caption reads 
µ7RZDUGVWKH7RNLIO\LQJRQFHPRUH¶WKHVDWR\DPDDJULFXOWXUDOODQGVFDSHLQ$LNDZDZHVWHUQ6DGR
7KH.RGRWDLNRGUXPJURXS¶VEDVHLQ2JL7RZQVRXWKZestern Sado; Saké produced exclusively by 
Hokusetsu of Hamochi in Sado for the Nobu international restaurant chain; original growth temperate 
rain forest in northeastern Sado; and Sado City gymnasium and base for the Sado City Sports 
Promotion Association. (All photos © Peter Matanle.) 
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